Higher education, employers’ monopsony power and the labour share in OECD countries by Daudey, Emilie & Decreuse, Bruno
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Higher education, employers’ monopsony
power and the labour share in OECD
countries
Emilie Daudey and Bruno Decreuse
July 2006
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3631/
MPRA Paper No. 3631, posted 19 June 2007
Higher education, employers’ monopsony power and the labour
share in OECD countries∗
Emilie Daudey†
GREQAM
Bruno Decreuse‡
GREQAM
July 4, 2006
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of higher education on the labour share. It is based on the
following idea: as education oﬀers adaptability skills, it should reduce employers’ monopsony power
and, therefore, increase the labour share. This idea is developed in a two-sector model with search
unemployment and wage competition between employers to attract/keep workers. Using panel data
for eleven OECD countries, we show that the proportion of higher educated in the population has
a significant positive eﬀect on the labour share: typically, an increase of one standard deviation in
higher education induces a three point increase in the labour share. The other determinants of the
labour share are compatible with the theoretical model. They include the capital-output ratio (-),
minimum to median wage ratio (+), union density (+). We also find that the unemployment rate
has a negative and significant impact on the labour share, which, together with the positive impact
of higher education, is incompatible with a three-factor model where factors are paid their marginal
products.
Keywords: Search frictions; Adaptability; Labour share; Macroeconomic panel data
JEL classification: E25; I20; J60
∗We would like to thank participants to the 2006 T2M conference in Toulouse and to macro seminars at University
of Aix-Marseille II, University of British Columbia, and University of Konstanz for their constructive remarks. We are
more particulary indebted to Paul Baudry, Pierre Cahuc, Olivier Charlot, Pierre-Philippe Combes, Daniele Checchi, Cecilia
Garcia-Penalosa, Pierre Granier, and Michel Normandin. The usual disclaimer applies.
†GREQAM - 2, rue de la charité, 13236 Marseille Cedex 02. E-mail: daudey@ehess.univ-mrs.fr
‡GREQAM and University of Aix-Marseille II — 2, rue de la charité, 13236 Marseille Cedex 02. E-mail: de-
creuse@univmed.fr
1
1 Introduction
Human capital matters. However, its composition is probably as important as its level. The individual
performance on the labour market as well as the impact of macroeconomic shocks dramatically depends
on whether human capital is general or specific, that is whether one’s skills can easily be transferred
from a job to another or not. Several papers have thus recently argued human capital is more general
in the US than in continental Europe (see e.g. Krueger and Kumar, 2002, and Wasmer, 2005). This
helps explain the well established diverging paths in unemployment and/or wage inequality. It is also
argued that higher education is more likely to provide general rather than specific human capital (see for
instance Gould, Moav, and Weinberg, 2001, Aghion, Howitt and Violante, 2002, and Charlot, Decreuse
and Granier, 2005). Those papers rely on the idea that higher education makes the workers more
adaptable, while adaptability has become increasingly important in the development process. Those
contributions have also examined the role of market frictions and labour market institutions in shaping
the incentives to acquire general human capital (see Wasmer, 2005, or Charlot et al, 2005). However,
a much less emphasized (though very intuitive) prediction of such models is that wages at given GDP
should increase with higher education, as adaptability skills raise workers’ outside opportunities. This
paper investigates such a theoretical prediction, and confronts it to macro data. It also controls for
alternative theories oﬀering such a positive relationship between higher education and the labour share.
Two main points are emphasized: employers derive some market power from workers’ imperfect mobility
on the labour market, while higher education may raise workers’ mobility. Higher education therefore
reduces employers’ monopsony power and raises the labour share.
An example may be useful to broadly illustrate our ideas. Mathieu and Julien are two twin brothers.
They have similar jobs in the same town. However, Mathieu spent two additional years at university, and
he learnt English, while Julien, otherwise seemingly identical, can only speak French. After some years
of job experience, one notices that Mathieu is paid fifteen percent more than Julien, although he never
worked with English-speaking people. Why is it so? Likely because Mathieu’s outside opportunities are
higher than Julien’s. Mathieu may have been contacted by other employers, or may have simply used the
potential threat of searching a job in another company. Consequently, employers decided to raise his pay
rate, in order to keep him or prevent other firms from poaching him. A general lesson stems from such an
example. Higher education provides adaptability skills. Such skills are highly valued on modern labour
markets, where workers’ mobility over the technological space is reduced, so that employers have market
power on wage determination. As a result, those who benefit from adaptability skills end up being paid
more at given output : their skills lower employers’ market power. Hence, the labour share should increase
with the proportion of Mathieus in the workforce, i.e. with the proportion of higher educated.
Traditional human capital theory with perfectly competitive labour markets clearly explains wage
inequality between workers with diﬀerent educational background. More educated are better paid be-
cause they supply more skills, and competition between potential employers drives their wage towards
(marginal) productivity. However, the theory has much less to say concerning the relationship between
the labour share of income and the proportion of higher educated. In this paper, we complement the
traditional view in two ways. On the one hand, we consider a frictional labour market. On the other
hand, we emphasize the mobility skills oﬀered by education.
When factors are paid their marginal products, the labour share only depends on relative factor uses
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and there is no room for the story developed above. However, labour economists have recognized for
long workers’ mobility is imperfect: job requirements as well as workers’ skills are heterogenous, between
state or city mobility is reduced, information on vacancies is poor, and so on. As Stigler (1961) initially
noticed, search frictions should provide employers with monopsony power. Modern monopsony models of
the labour market are thus based on the idea that there is a continuum of potential employers, yet search
frictions prevent the workers from moving instantaneously from one job to another1. For our purpose, the
consideration of search frictions/monopsony power is very interesting: the labour share not only depends
on relative factor uses, but also on the fundamentals of such monopsony power.
The idea that education provides the workers with adaptability skills is very widespread in the field
of growth theory. Nelson and Phelps (1966) point out two essential dimensions of education: the ability
to adapt to technological change and the ability to innovate2. Nelson and Phelps’ notion of adaptability
has been applied in many recent studies. In LLoyd-Ellis (1999), minimum skill levels are required to
implement new but equiproductive technologies and workers diﬀer in the range of technologies they can
implement. Krueger and Kumar (2002) assume that general (by opposition to vocational) education re-
duces the probability that the workers suﬀer a loss of task-specific productivity following the introduction
of a new technology. Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002) assume that new technologies are sector-specific
and workers must be adaptable to implement any such new technology. The longer the schooling period
when young, the more likely it is that the worker can use the new technology when old. Importantly,
adaptability skills are especially needed on frictional labour markets. Manning (2001) has an illuminating
way to understand this point: small is beautiful in the competitive model, because scarcity is the essence
of worship. Thus specific skills are important. However, the use of specific skills in frictional markets
becomes eventual, and scarcity leads to long-term unemployment, sub-employment of skills, or lower than
marginal product wage. It follows that workers have huge incentives to acquire general skills, which are
more likely to be acquired through higher education.
The paper is composed of three parts. We first propose a theoretical model. Then, we provide
estimates of the determinants of the labour share. Finally, we confront our empirical results to potential
alternative models of the labour share.
Our setup can be depicted in more details as follows. We consider two sectors, each associated to a
specific technology. Workers are either educated or not. Educated workers are more likely to be able to
operate on both technologies than uneducated workers. Employers have some market power because of
entry costs and search frictions. The search market is segmented by sector. Employers set the wage, while
due to search frictions workers may receive either one or two job oﬀers (one from each sector). If they
receive only one job oﬀer, they obtain no more than their reservation wage. If they receive two oﬀers,
employers enter Bertrand competition to attach labour services, and workers receive their full marginal
product3. Consequently, the share of output accruing to labour rises with the proportion of job-seekers
receiving two oﬀers. Such a proportion depends on the state of activity (job availability, which in turn
1Those models successfully address major issues such as the extent of discrimination, wage heterogeneity for similar
workers, the spike of the wage distribution at the minimum wage (see for instance Manning, 2001, for a survey).
2This view has received some support at the micro level, either from studies of US industries (Bartel and Lichtenberg,
1987), or plants (Dunne and Schmitz, 1995, Doms, Dunne and Troske, 1997).
3The fact wages result from Bertrand competition between employers has been investigated by Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002a, 2002b) in models with on-the-job search. Other models postulate firms post wages along with vacancies and commit
to pay the posted wage (see, e.g. Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, or Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000).
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depends on job profitability), as well as on workers’ mobility between sectors. Here comes our view of
education: given that the educated are more adaptable, they tend to prospect the two types of jobs.
They are thus more likely to receive additional oﬀers. At the macroeconomic level, the labour share is
thus increasing in the share of educated. Our model predicts other determinants of the labour share:
capital intensity, labour market institutions, and unemployment rate. As in the perfectly competitive
model, the labour share should be aﬀected by capital per worker, yet the actual sign of the relationship
depends on whether capital and labour are substitutes (-) or complements (+). The unemployment
rate should reduce the labour share as it means, other things being equal, that it is more diﬃcult to
benefit from several job oﬀers. Labour market institutions like the minimum wage or union power have a
positive impact on the labour share specific to monopsony models of the labour market. Those diﬀerent
predictions can be tested on macroeconomic data.
Our empirical analysis covers eleven OECD countries from 1970 to 2000. The variable of higher edu-
cation is borrowed from Barro and Lee (2000): we use the share of tertiary educated, which corresponds
to post-secondary schooling. We regress the labour share on the proportion of higher educated, diﬀerent
labour market variables, the unemployment rate, the capital to output ratio as a proxy of capital intensity,
and the degree of openness. The regressions include country fixed eﬀects and common time dummies.
Typically, an increase of one standard deviation in higher education induces a three point increase in the
labour share4. Once accounting for actual changes in higher education throughout our sample, we show
that such changes have sustained the actual labour shares by 2 to 7 points. The US experienced a 3 point
reduction in the labour share and France a 6 point. This divergence coincides with the actual diﬀerence
in the contribution of education in these two countries that has pushed up the labour share by 6 points in
the former and only by 3 points in the latter. The labour market variables have all the expected sign and
are significant — the unemployment rate must be instrumented. Finally, the capital to output ratio has a
negative impact, suggesting capital and labour are substitutes rather than complements. The magnitude
of the impact, however, depends on whether the regression includes a control for technological change
or not. For instance, it is very high when time dummies are omitted, but becomes insignificant once
time dummies and an index of R&D investments are included5. Our interpretation is that technological
change has raised firms’ technological complexity, reducing workers’ mobility, thereby increasing firms’
monopsony power6.
One may wonder whether such aggregate empirical evidence can be derived from an alternative theory
of education and the labour market or not. We thus examine an alternative theoretical framework where
output depends on three factors: educated labour, uneducated labour, and capital. The only assumption
we make is that factors are paid their marginal products, which is consistent with various models of wage
determination. We proceed in two steps. First, we wonder if the labour share can increase with the ratio
of educated employment to uneducated employment. The answer is a timid yes, given that this implies
strong restrictions on the set of possible substitutions between the diﬀerent inputs. Second, we question if
4We also take into account the impact of higher education on the unemployment rate and capital to output ratio.
5 In all these specifications, the coeﬃcient associated to the proportion of higher educated is unchanged.
6This explanation is complementary to Acemoglu (2003), who argues European firms had incentives to develop capital-
biased technologies, because wages were set too high. Such technological change can decrease the labour share in the
medium run. We depart from this analysis in two ways. First, the change in labour share is not due to changes in output
technology, but to increased employers’ market power. Second, the impact on the labour share is not limited to the medium
run and can take place in the longer run.
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the labour share can increase with labour market institutions and decrease with the unemployment rate,
given that it increases with higher education. The answer is a strong no. In such model, labour market
institutions can only aﬀect the labour share through changes in the relative employment rate of educated
to uneducated workers. This ratio increases with the relative supply of educated workers. However, it
is also positively correlated with the global unemployment rate (empirically, we show that a one point
increase in global unemployment rate implies a .5 increase in the unemployment rate diﬀerential between
educated and uneducated workers). Two major predictions follow. On the one hand, the impact of the
unemployment rate has the same sign as the impact of the proportion of higher educated. Therefore,
it must be positive, rather than negative. On the other hand, the impact of labour market institutions
should not be significant if one controls for relative factor uses. These two predictions are not consistent
with our empirical results which indicate the unemployment rate has a negative impact on the labour
share, and labour market institutions have a positive impact on the labour share despite we control for
relative factor uses. On the contrary, such predictions are in line with our theoretical model.
This paper is related to the literature on the determinants of the labour share. Studies of the labour
share have known a renewal with Rodrik (1997), who argues that globalization hurts labour by eroding
workers’ bargaining power. Ortega and Rodriguez (2001) show that the degree of openness (usually
defined as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) has a negative impact on labour shares. Harrison
(2002) obtains similar results with alternative measures of globalization, like the degree of capital account
openness. Blanchard (1997) and Acemoglu (2003) point out the role of firms’ technological choices, that
may have been incited to promote capital-augmenting technological progress. The literature has also
focused on imperfections on the good market. The labour share typically decreases with firms’ mark-up
over marginal products. Blanchard (1997) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) evoke the structural rise in
such mark-ups as a potential cause of the decline in European labour shares — yet they immediately refute
such explanation. Finally, there are papers examining the role played by labour market imperfections.
Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2005) question the impacts of labour market institutions on income in-
equality in OECD countries. Among other results, they show that the minimum wage, union density and
unemployment benefits positively aﬀect the labour share. However, they explain such impact in a three-
factor model where factors are paid their marginal productivity. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) note
that the so-called right-to-manage bargaining model has limited properties, as the firm finally chooses a
point on the labour demand. Alternatively, they point out the eﬃcient bargaining model, or the intro-
duction of labour adjustment costs can move the firm out of her labour demand, and thus gives some
explanatory power to labour market variables. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) explore a diﬀerent route.
They consider simultaneously monopolistic competition on the good market, and collective eﬃcient wage
bargaining. Monopolistic competition creates rents, while workers’ bargaining power distributes such
rents between firms and workers. As far as the working of the labour market is concerned, our paper
diﬀers more in philosophy than in facts. If we introduced our view of higher education in Blanchard and
Giavazzi’s model, higher education would increase the wage by raising workers’ outside options in the
bargaining game, thereby raising the labour share in the long run7. However, we included a measure of
imperfect competition in our statistical analysis. It never revealed significant, casting some doubt on the
7Blanchard and Giavazzi do not especially focus on the labour share. However, they wonder in an extension of their
model if it can explain the decrease in European labour shares observed since the beginning of the 1980s. They conclude
that it could be attributed to an exogenous decline in workers’ bargaining power.
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actual impact of imperfect competition in the good market on the labour share.
The rest of the paper is composed of five sections. In section 2, we show how education can reduce
firms’ monopsony power in a two-sector model of search unemployment. We also discuss the various
factors that can aﬀect the labour share through extensions. In section 3, we present regression estimates
of the labour share on the diﬀerent factors suggested by the theory. In section 4, we consider potential
alternative theories of the positive relationship between higher education and the labour share. Section
5 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
The main intuition of our model can be stated in a few words. Suppose that there are two types of
workers: the educated and the uneducated. Workers are equally productive. However, educated workers
are perfectly mobile, and thus manage to get the full marginal product of their contribution to output.
Conversely, uneducated workers are attached to a single firm, and only get the monopsony wage, say 0. If
labour is the only production factor, the labour share coincides with the proportion of educated workers
in the workforce, i.e. it increases with this latter proportion.
Our model goes beyond this simple intuition to justify the links between firms’ monopsony power
and education, and to provide us with empirically convincing determinants of the labour share. In our
model, monopsony power is originated by the combination of entry costs and search frictions, while
education erodes monopsony power because it improves the scope of workers’ skills. There are two
sectors/technologies, the matching market is segmented by sector and education increases the number of
technologies a worker can operate. Consequently, a more educated worker benefits from a larger number
of expected job oﬀers. It follows that firms’ market power decreases with education, and there is a positive
relationship between education and the labour share.
We proceed in two steps. First, we present the basic model. Then, we discuss several extensions.
2.1 The basic model
The model is static. There are two final goods entering preferences symmetrically. Each good is produced
within an autonomous sector. There are a continuum of firms and workers.
2.1.1 Model environment
Each firm is endowed with a single job slot, which can be either active or inactive. To get an active job,
the firm must first choose a technology (a sector) and pay the entry cost χ > 0. This cost is a shadow
cost involved by product market regulation8 as in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). Once the cost is paid,
the firm chooses capital size k, which unit rental price is r. In both sectors, the production function is
the same. Output is produced by means of the technology f (k); it is strictly increasing, strictly concave
and satisfies the Inada conditions. In addition, α (k) = kf 0(k)/f(k) ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output
with respect to capital. To simplify, there is no irreversibility in capital choice: the firm can resell its
capital without loss on the capital market. According to this assumption, everything happens as if firms
8Firms make superprofits in our model. It is implicit that such profits do not correspond to labour income.
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were choosing capital after the worker is hired9. Inactive jobs cost nothing. We denote by ni the number
of active firms in sector i. As Blanchard and Giavazzi, we assume that the entry cost is proportional
to output. This assumption is of no importance, but allows us to account for the fact that there is no
clear empirical relationship between unemployment and the development level. Hence, the cost is worth
χ = cf (k).
There is a mass 1 of workers who diﬀer in two respects: education and mobility. First, workers
are either educated or uneducated. Educated workers are in proportion π ∈ [0, 1]. Second they are
either mobile or immobile. Mobile workers can operate on both sectors, while the immobile are assigned
(symmetrically) to either one of the two sectors. The proportion of mobile workers is σ ∈ [0, 1]. For
simplicity, the only role of education is to oﬀer mobility skills. The proportion of mobile workers is thus
larger among the educated than among the uneducated. Let qπ and q1−π be the proportion of mobile
workers among, respectively, educated and uneducated workers; we have qπ > q1−π. It follows that the
overall proportion of mobile workers is σ = qππ + q1−π (1− π). It is increasing in the proportion of
educated.
Active jobs and job-seekers meet each other on the search market. It is segmented by technology,
which means that matching takes place at the sector level. In each sector i, the total number of contacts
Mi between firms ni advertising sector-specific positions, and workers ui seeking such jobs is determined
by a constant-returns to scale matching technology, so that Mi = M (ui, ni). Let θi = ni/ui denote
market i specific tightness, and m (θi) = M (1, θi) be the matching technology in intensive form. We
assume that m is strictly increasing, strictly concave, with m (0) = 0, and m (θ) < min {1, θ} for all θ ≥ 0.
Firm’s and worker’s probability of getting a contact on market i are then respectively given by m (θi) /θi
and m (θi). In addition, let η (θ) = θm0 (θ) /m (θ) ∈ (0, 1) be the elasticity of the matching technology
with respect to vacancies.
There is no restriction on the number of sectors prospected by job-seekers, but the requirement workers
can operate the underlying technology. Consequently, immobile workers only seek a job in one sector,
while the mobile search on both sectors. It follows that the number of job-seekers is ui = σ + (1− σ) /2
on each market.
Importantly, a worker may receive at most one oﬀer from a given market. But mobile individuals may
receive an additional oﬀer from the other sector. As firms are bound to search on only one sector, they
have at most one contact.
2.1.2 Equilibrium
Employers set the wage. Hence, if the contacted worker has no alternative option, the wage is w =
0. However, if the worker received another job oﬀer, employers enter Bertrand competition for labour
services. It follows that immobile workers always receive a wage equal to 0, while mobile workers may
get the whole output. The probability that a mobile worker does not receive any such alternative oﬀer
is 1 −m (θ). As sectors are perfectly symmetric, prices of the two final goods are equal in equilibrium
and tightness is the same in each sector. We directly account for these facts, and normalize the common
9 In the next subsection, we introduce capital choice irreversibility. Though the central message of the model is not
altered, this gives birth to endogenous capital dispersion.
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price to 1. The typical profit function is:
V = max
k
½
−χ+ m (θ)
θ
∙
1− σ
1 + σ
(f (k)− rk) + 2σ
1 + σ
(1−m (θ)) (f (k)− rk)
¸¾
(1)
Grouping terms yields:
V = −χ+ m (θ)
θ
1− σ + 2σ (1−m (θ))
1 + σ
max
k
{f (k)− rk} (2)
Hence, f 0 (k) = r. Capital owners manage to preserve their income and capital is paid its marginal
product.
The number of firms adjusts so as to ensure profits are nil in equilibrium. Thus, tightness responds
to profitability. In equilibrium, tightness is derived from the free entry condition (V = 0):
c =
m (θ)
θ
∙
1− 2σm (θ)
1 + σ
¸
(1− α (k)) (3)
The latter equation defines tightness as a function of the entry cost χ (-), the elasticity of output with
respect to capital (+), and the proportion of mobile workers σ (-). Sector-specific tightness thus decreases
with the proportion of educated, reflecting the decline in profitability.
2.1.3 Labour share
Total output is
Y = (1− σ)m (θ) f (k) + σ
h
2m (θ) (1−m (θ)) +m (θ)2
i
f (k)
while the total wage bill is
W = σm (θ)2 (1− α (k)) f (k) (4)
It follows that the labour share is
LS = [1− α (k)] σm (θ)
1 + σ − σm (θ) < 1− α (k) (5)
Due to employers’ monopsony power, the labour share is lower than the elasticity of aggregate output with
respect to labour. It is increasing in tightness and education. Indeed, they both increase the probability
of receiving oﬀers from alternative sectors. It improves the average wage through Bertrand competition
among potential employers. As tightness is decreasing in education, the overall impact of education seems
ambiguous. Indeed,
dLS
dπ
=
∂LS
∂π
>0
+
∂LS
∂θ
dθ
dπ
<0
(6)
However, the decline in tightness is not suﬃciently strong to oﬀset the direct eﬀect. Indeed, we can
write from (5):
σm (θ)
1 + σ
=
LS
1− α+ LS
The free entry condition (3) becomes:
c =
m (θ)
θ
∙
1− 2 LS
1− α+ LS
¸
(1− α (k)) (7)
We know that equilibrium tightness is decreasing in education. Thus LS must increase with education
for equality (7) to hold: in equilibrium, LS is thus increasing in the proportion of educated.
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Equation (5) suggests the following empirical determinants of the labour share: capital intensity,
sector-specific tightness and education. Sector-specific tightness is not available in the data. Rather, we
use the unemployment rate. Indeed, the global unemployment rate is strictly decreasing in tightness and
education. To show this, note that mobile workers’ probability not to receive any oﬀer is (1−m (θ))2.
Similarly, immobile workers’ probability not to receive any oﬀer is 1−m (θ). The global unemployment
rate is thus
u = σ (1−m (θ))2 + (1− σ) (1−m (θ)) (8)
As tightness increases with employers’ share in output, the unemployment rate is endogenous and should
properly be instrumented in regressions.
2.2 Extensions
Our basic model predicts education should raise the labour share. In this sub-section, we consider several
extensions. We first consider the role played by labour market institutions. Then we turn to the analysis
of irreversible capital costs. We also discuss education as a production factor, and examine what happens
when education simultaneously expands the quantity and the quality of prospected jobs. Finally, we
examine the role played by firms’ technological choices.
2.2.1 Labour market institutions and the fiscal wedge
Our first extension focuses on the minimum wage, unionization, and the fiscal wedge. Suppose that there
is a minimum wage equal to βf (k), with β < 1−α (k). The only change is that workers who receive just
one oﬀer are now paid the minimum wage rather than 0. The labour share is now:
LS = β + [1− α (k)− β] σm (θ)
1 + σ − σm (θ) (9)
It is still increasing in education. It also directly increases with the minimum wage. However, the mini-
mum wage also aﬀects firms’ profitability, thereby decreasing tightness. Indeed, the free entry condition
now writes
c =
m (θ)
θ
∙
1− 2σm (θ)
1 + σ
¸
(1− α (k)− β) (10)
For similar reasons, the degree of unionization is likely to increase the labour share. Suppose for instance
that unionized workers can collectively bargain their wage in case they do not receive alternative oﬀers.
Assuming Nash bargaining and zero outside options, the bargained wage is γ (1− α (k)) f (k), where
γ ∈ (0, 1) is union’s bargaining power. The labour share then becomes:
LS = [1− α (k)]
½
γ +
σm (θ)
1 + σ − σm (θ) (1− γ)
¾
(11)
It is still increasing in education. The previous discussion applies: union power has two impacts. The
direct impact is positive, while the indirect impact due to a reduction in tightness is negative.
Finally, the fiscal wedge does not directly alter the labour share. However, it interacts with other
labour market institutions so that it can increase the labour share. For instance, let τ be the (flat) payroll
tax rate on the wage bill. If βf (k) is the minimum wage, then βf (k) (1 + τ) is employers’ cost at the
minimum wage. The labour share is thus
LS = β (1 + τ) + [1− α (k)− β (1 + τ)] σm (θ)
1 + σ − σm (θ) (12)
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The main implication of this discussion is the following. If an econometrician were to regress the
labour share on the minimum wage, an index of union power, and the unemployment rate, she should
find a positive impact of the two labour market institutions and a negative impact of the unemployment
rate. This is a major diﬀerence with a model in which factors are paid their marginal product. In this
latter case, labour market institutions only aﬀect the labour share through their impact on unemployment
rate — see Section 4.
2.2.2 Irreversible capital choices
Up to now we have assumed that capital can be resold at no cost, or, alternatively it is chosen after the
wage is determined. We now consider irreversible capital costs. Such an irreversibility originates capital
and wage dispersion10. However, the labour share is still likely to increase with higher education. Let Φ
denote the symmetric sector-specific capital distribution. Firms’ owners now maximize
V = max
k
½
V (k) = −rk + m (θ)
θ
∙
1− σ
1 + σ
f (k) +
2σ
1 + σ
(1−m (θ)) f (k)
+
2σ
1 + σ
m (θ)
Z
ek<k
h
f (k)− f
³ek´i dΦ³ek´¸¾ (13)
The novelty comes from the third term within brackets. With probability (m (θ) /θ)×m (θ) 2σ/ (1 + σ),
the firm contacts a mobile worker and this worker receives an alternative oﬀer from the other sector.
Bertrand competition between employers ensures the worker is hired in the most productive job, and
drives her wage to the output of the less productive job. The first-order condition yields
r = f 0 (k)
m (θ)
θ
½
1− 2σm (θ) [1− Φ (k)]
1 + σ
¾
(14)
The rental price of capital is equal to its marginal benefit, i.e. marginal productivity times the probability
to fill the position. Given the latter probability depends on firm’s ranking in the capital distribution,
equation (14) defines the cdf of the equilibrium distribution of capital per worker. The lower bound k0
and upper bound k1 of the support of this distribution result from Φ (k0) = 0 and Φ (k1) = 1. This yields
r = f 0 (k0)
m (θ)
θ
µ
1− 2σm (θ)
1 + σ
¶
= f 0 (k1)
m (θ)
θ
(15)
The upper-bound is decreasing in tightness, as tightness reduces the probability to contact a worker.
The lower bound is decreasing in education as it raises the probability the worker gets an alternative
oﬀer. Given tightness is decreasing in education, education widens capital dispersion. Finally, the price
of the scarce resource is p = V = V (k) for all k ∈ [k0, k1]. In particular, p = V (k0), which yields
p = k0 (1− α (k0)) /α (k0).11
10This result is not new. In a model where firms set wages ex-ante (and commit to pay the posted wage) and workers
may receive several oﬀers at a time, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) also obtain capital dispersion. In Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002a), there is Bertrand competition between employers, but workers can only receive one oﬀer at a time. However,
workers search on the job.
11The capital distribution is non-degenerate because irreversible capital choices would involve a discontinuity in the
marginal benefit of capital investment at the equilibrium. Indeed, assume that there is a symmetric equilibrium k∗, and let
us focus on the case where the firm contacts a worker who receives an alternative oﬀer. If the firm sets k = k∗, she gets the
marginal return f 0 (k∗) with probability 1/2, while she pays the marginal cost r in both cases. Her marginal profit is thus
1/2f 0 (k∗) − r. Now, if she invests slightly above k∗, she always hires the worker. In the limit case where k tends to k∗,
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To compute the labour share, consider firms which invested k ∈ [k0, k1]. Output produced by such
firms is:
y (k) =
m (θ)
θ
f (k)
½
1− 2σm (θ)
1 + σ
[1− Φ (k)]
¾
(16)
Using (14), we get
α (k) y (k) = rk (17)
Similarly, the total wage bill paid by such firms is
ω (k) =
m (θ)
θ
2σm (θ)
1 + σ
Z
κ≤k
f (κ) dΦ (κ) (18)
In equilibrium, we have
ω (k) = y (k)− rk − p = (1− α (k)) f (k)− p (19)
The labour share is
LS =
R
k ω (k) dΦ (k)R
k y (k) dΦ (k)
(20)
=
R
k
h
(1−α(k))k
α(k) −
(1−α(k0))k0
α(k0)
i
dΦ (k)R
k
k
α(k)dΦ (k)
(21)
The labour share is of course 0 when there are no mobile workers. Thus, it should increase with higher
education. Intuitively, workers get better paid at given capital distribution. However, it turns out the
result cannot be established in the general case. The reason is due to the fact that higher education
also modifies capital choices. It raises the weight of firms located on the far left and far right of the
distribution, so that dispersion rises. We thus consider the Cobb-Douglas case. When α (k) = α for all
k, it comes
LS = (1− α)
£
1− k0/k
¤
(22)
Hence, the labour share increases with education whenever the ratio of minimum capital investment to
average capital decreases. Education widens capital dispersion, which suggests that the latter ratio should
actually go down. Formally, we get
k/k0 =
1− α
2− α
µ
1 + σ
2σm (θ)
− 1
¶"µ
1− 2σm (θ)
1 + σ
¶ 2−α
α−1
− 1
#
(23)
It is increasing in the proportion π of higher-educated. It follows that the positive relationship between
higher education and the labour share is not a pure artefact of the simple model. In the remaining
of this section, we maintain the assumption of a perfect market for unused capital. Another learning
of this second extension is that capital choice, and, consequently, average capital intensity, respond to
profitability. Average capital intensity is thus endogenous to the labour share, and should be properly
instrumented in econometric regressions.
her marginal profit is thus f 0 (k∗)− r > 1/2f 0 (k∗)− r. This implies that there is no symmetric equilibrium. When capital
choices are reversible, such a discontinuity does not occur, because the firm pays the rental price of capital if and only if
she hires the worker.
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2.2.3 Education as a production factor
For simplicity, our discussions assume that education only oﬀers mobility skills. We now consider the case
where education oﬀers both mobility and productive skills. We suggest that the productive component
of education is unlikely to originate a positive impact of higher education on the labour share.
Assume that education not only alters workers’ mobility, but also improves their productivity. Hence,
output produced by an educated worker (whether mobile or not) is y = Af (k), with A > 1, while it is
still y = f (k) when the worker is uneducated. As individual productivity is heterogenous, it is no longer
equivalent to choose capital before and after recruitment. To avoid useless complexity at this stage of
the discussion, we assume that firms choose capital once the worker is known. Capital intensity depends
on education according to
Af 0 (kπ) = r = f 0 (k1−π) (24)
Let i denote the education group, Yi is total output produced by i-workers, while LSi is the labour share
accruing to such workers. The total labour share is:
LS =
Yπ
Yπ + Y1−π
LSπ +
µ
1− Yπ
Yπ + Y1−π
¶
LS1−π (25)
with
LSi = (1− α (ki))
qim (θ)
1 + qi (1−m (θ))
(26)
Yπ = π [1 + qπ (1−m (θ))]m (θ)Af (kπ) (27)
Y1−π = (1− π) [1 + q1−π (1−m (θ))]m (θ) f (k1−π) (28)
Two important points should be noted. On the one hand, Yπ/π > Y1−π/ (1− π). Output per educated
individual is larger than output per uneducated. This results from two facts: educated are more produc-
tive (education is now a production factor), and their employment rate is higher (education still oﬀers
adaptability skills). On the other hand, LSπ and LS1−π diﬀer in two ways. First, educated are more
mobile, which tends to imply that LSπ >LS1−π. Second, kπ > k1−π means that α (kπ) and α (k1−π) are
generally diﬀerent, though the direction of this eﬀect depends on the technology f . For instance, α (k) is
strictly increasing (decreasing) with k when capital and labour are substitutes (complements) in output.
Provided that this latter eﬀect can be neglected with respect to the former (or has the same sign), we
should have LSπ >LS1−π, which we now assume.
What is the impact of A, the schooling eﬀect on productivity? Formally,
dLS
dA
=
dYπ/Y
dA
(LSπ − LS1−π) > 0 (29)
This eﬀect is positive because an increase in A raises the weight of mobile workers in output. At given
labour share per education group, this increases the overall labour share. This suggests that the pro-
ductivity eﬀect of education should only have second-order impacts on the labour share in our model.
Indeed, suppose that there is no eﬀect of education on workers’ mobility. Hence, qπ = q1−π = q. Consider
an increase in π. This yields
dLS
dπ
=
dYπ/Y
dπ
(LSπ − LS1−π) (30)
which has the sign of α (k1−π) − α (kπ). Hence, it only depends on the technology. In the absence of
any impact of education on mobility, education only aﬀects the labour share through changes in capital
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intensity. There are two main implications. First, the impact of education can only be positive if capital
and labour are complements in output. In Section 3, we show that capital intensity tends to decrease the
labour share rather than to increase it, suggesting capital and labour are actually substitutes. Second, as
far as the econometrician controls for capital intensity, higher education should not alter the labour share.
Or, alternatively, if one gets a positive impact of higher education although capital intensity is among the
regressors, she must deduce that higher education has an adaptability component and therefore tends to
reduce employers’ monopsony power.
2.2.4 Vertical vs horizontal heterogeneity
In this paper, we adopt the view that higher education allows one to adapt to diﬀerent technologies of
similar levels. Higher education, therefore, improves horizontal occupational mobility. However, several
papers have suggested that higher education actually increases occupational mobility vertically, rather
than horizontally. For instance, educated individuals have access to complex jobs, that are especially
designed to them, and simple jobs, that everyone can occupy12. Whether mobility increases horizontally
or vertically does not matter for our purpose. What accounts is the fact that job opportunities are more
important for the educated than for the uneducated. To see this, it is necessary to slightly alter the
model. The main change is the following: all individuals can work in sector 1, the old sector, while only
the mobile can work in sector 2, the modern sector. To simplify, assume that the two goods are perfectly
substitutable in consumers’ preferences, so that they have the same price, normalized to one13. Profits
are in each sector
V1 = max
k
½
−χ+ m (θ1)
θ1
× [(1− σ) (f (k)− rk) + σ (1−m (θ2)) (f (k)− rk)]
+σm (θ2)Ek2 (max {f (k)− rk − f (k2) + rk2, 0}) (31)
V2 = max
k
½
−χ+ m (θ2)
θ2
(1−m (θ1)) (f (k)− rk)
+
m (θ2)
θ2
m (θ1)Ek1 (max {f (k)− rk − f (k1) + rk1, 0})
¾
(32)
Hence, f 0 (k) = r in each sector. Free entry implies
c =
m (θ1)
θ1
[1− σ + σ (1−m (θ2))] [1− α (k)] (33)
c =
m (θ2)
θ2
[1−m (θ1)] [1− α (k)] (34)
Those equations define a unique equilibrium vector (θ1, θ2). Then, the labour share is worth
LS =
σm (θ1)m (θ2)
m (θ1) + σm (θ2) [1−m (θ1)]
(35)
It is increasing in σ, the proportion of mobile workers. The positive impact of higher education on the
labour share does not depend on whether educated workers have access to better jobs or similar jobs.
What matters is that they have access to a larger set of opportunities, regardless the quality of such
opportunities.
12 See, e.g., Acemoglu (1999), and Albrecht and Vroman (2002) in matching models.
13As in the symmetric model, perfect susbtitutability between the two goods implies that the two types of workers are
perfectly substitutable in final output. The positive impact of higher education on the labour share does not depend on
this assumption, which is made for simplicity.
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2.2.5 Technological complexity
Our final extension focuses on the role played by technological complexity. Education improves workers’
adaptability. To a large extent, the value of adaptability is contingent on the skill requirements of the
technology. In this extension, we discuss the impact of technological complexity, that raises productivity
but also sector-specific skill requirements.
To make things simple, let t ≥ 0 denote (exogenous) technological complexity. Technological com-
plexity raises output according to tf (k). However, it also reduces the proportion of mobile workers. We
thus assume that qπ = qπ (t) and q1−π = q1−π (t) are both decreasing in t, with qπ (t) > q1−π (t) and
0 ≥ q0π (t) > q01−π (t) for all t ≥ 0. Hence, education protects (at least partially) the transferability of
skills between sectors against technological complexity. Those assumptions have two important implica-
tions. First, the labour share is decreasing in technological complexity. Indeed, technological complexity
reduces the proportion σ of mobile workers, thereby decreasing average wage14 at given output. It means
that technological change reduces the labour share15. Second, capital intensity is now determined by
tf 0 (k) = r. Capital per worker is thus increasing in technological complexity. But, technological com-
plexity is diﬃcult to observe, while capital intensity is not. Suppose that the econometrician has data
concerning capital intensity, but no proxy for technological complexity. Then, the econometrician is likely
to observe a negative impact of capital intensity on the labour share, reflecting the positive correlation
between capital intensity and unobserved technological complexity.
2.2.6 From the theory to the empirical analysis
Three linearized relationships can be derived from our theoretical model: an equation for the labour share,
and two equations which accounts for the endogeneity of the unemployment rate and capital intensity.
Indeed, the labour share is a function LS(k, u, π,Γ), while equilibrium unemployment rate and capital
intensity are functions u (π,Γ) and k (π,Γ, r), where Γ is a set of exogenous parameters corresponding
mainly to labour market institutions. In the neighborhood of some (π0,Γ0), we have
LS = LS0 +
∂LS0
∂u
(u− u0) +
∂LS0
∂k
(k − k0) +
∂LS0
∂π
(π − π0) +
∂LS0
∂Γ
(Γ− Γ0) (36)
u = u0 +
∂u0
∂π
(π − π0) +
∂u0
∂Γ
(Γ− Γ0) (37)
k = k0 +
∂k0
∂π
(π − π0) +
∂k0
∂Γ
(Γ− Γ0) +
∂k0
∂r
(r − r0) (38)
where LS0 =LS(k0, u0, π0,Γ0), u0 = u (π0,Γ0), and k0 = k (π0,Γ0, r0). The diﬀerent partial derivatives
are unobserved and must be parametrically estimated assuming some noise in the above equations. The
sign and significance of such parameters can be used to test the validity of our theory (thanks to the
labour share equation), and to compute the global impact of higher education (through combining the
various equations).
14At the same time, it increases tightness, but this is a second order eﬀect.
15Acemoglu (2001) has a close analysis. He suggests that European firms have been incited to develop capital-biased
technologies in response to wage rigidity. This may explain the observed decline in European labour shares since the early
1980s.
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3 Empirical analysis
The purpose of this section is to investigate the empirical impact of higher education on the labour
share. We use panel data covering OECD countries over the past three decades. The main result is
that the labour share is increasing in higher education. This result is robust to diﬀerent specifications
and sensitivity tests. The other determinants of the labour share are in line with the theoretical model
developed above: capital per worker (-), unemployment rate (-), union density (+), minimum to median
wage ratio (+).
3.1 Data
The dataset only covers OECD countries. This allows to abstract from the role played by the development
level, and its potential correlation with education. In addition, we can benefit from better and richer
data, especially labour market data. There are eleven countries16 over the period 1970-2000. The actual
sample size is dictated by data availability. Our preferred estimates are achieved on yearly data to keep
the maximum number of observations, but we also run regressions with data averaged over five-year
periods to control for cyclical eﬀects. The benchmark regressions are performed on 264 observations.
Data sources are detailed in the Appendix.
3.1.1 Labour share
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the labour share. The analysis of labour share
movements is awkward because it is very sensitive to the way we compute it. The basic definition used
by the United Nations is simply the ratio of employee compensation to value-added (referred to as the
‘naive measure’ in the remaining). Several problems arise with the naive measure, particularly when
we focus on international comparisons as documented by Gollin (2002). The most important one is
the lack of the earnings of the self-employed workers in the numerator while the value-added created
by such workers is part of the denominator. Neglecting this problem underestimates the labour share,
and, given actual changes in self-employment among OECD countries, may alter the actual evolution of
labour shares. Diﬀerent methods have been envisaged to correct for this bias (see Daudey, 2005). The
consensual method consists in assigning the same earnings to employed and non-employed workers.
LS adjusted =
compensation of employees
VA
× total workforce
number of employees
(39)
We use data from the OECD Economic Outlook (2002), that are suﬃciently detailed to establish several
indicators of the sharing of value-added, naive or adjusted for the self-employed in the business sector.
In the following, we mainly use the labour share adjusted for self-employed workers. However, we check
the robustness of our results to alternative measures of the labour share in sub-section 3.3.
3.1.2 Education
The key explicative variable in this paper is the proportion of higher-educated. We use the updated
Barro and Lee (2000) dataset, the most commonly used schooling data in empirical studies. It contains
series for schooling attainment by combining census data and enrollment rates, both taken primarily
16Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom, United States.
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from UNESCO for a broad number of countries. The dataset provides estimates of educational levels
attained and completed by persons over 25 — at five-year intervals for the years 1960-2000, in percentage
of the total population. Educational levels are ranked in four levels: no schooling, primary schooling,
secondary schooling and tertiary education. The proportion of higher educated is identified to the share
of post-secondary educated in the total population17. The basic data are five-year averages. We linearly
interpolate them to enter our annual dataset.
Figure 1 depicts the data. The proportion of higher educated increases in each country over the whole
period of investigation. However, the bulk of the increase takes place at diﬀerent dates. In addition, there
is some substantial heterogeneity between countries: 53% of the Canadians are endowed with a tertiary
education in 2000, while only 16% of the Spanish are in the same situation.
FIGURE 1
De la Fuente and Domenech (2000, 2002) document a number of suspicious features and inconsis-
tencies in Barro-Lee data. They suggest that it contains substantial measurement error that leads to
implausible time profiles. They construct a new database for OECD countries on educational attain-
ments in conformity with the Barro and Lee classification, not based anymore on enrollment data but
on various sources, as national census, surveys, statistics yearbooks and international publications. How-
ever, this latter database contains fewer observations than Barro and Lee. Our results are checked on it
in sub-section 3.3.
3.1.3 Technological variables
Even though the focus is on education, the most consensual determinant of the labour share is certainly
the capital to labour ratio. It is the only determinant of the labour share when capital and labour
are paid their marginal product. To account for real growth, it is necessary to adjust labour with a
labour productivity index. However, the computation of such an index involves the use of the labour
share. Following Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), we rather consider the capital-output ratio. There
is a one-to-one relationship between the capital-labour ratio k and the capital-output ratio κ. Indeed,
κ = k/f (k), which is increasing in k as f is strictly concave. The advantage of this formulation is that
the capital-output ratio does not know an a priori upward trend. The capital-output ratio is obtained
from the OECD Economic Outlook (2002) and is restricted to the business sector to be consistent with
our measure of the labor share. In sub-section 3.3, we check if our results still hold when we consider the
capital-output ratio in the whole economy.
3.1.4 Labour market variables
From the OECD Labour Force Statistics, we obtain the unemployment rate, the minimum to median
wage ratio, the union membership index, and the tax wedge.
TABLE 1
17The UNESCO classification (International Standard Classification of Education, ISCED) divides education in 6 cate-
gories. “Higher education” englobes levels 4, 5 and 6, where level 4 corresponds to post-secondary non-tertiary education,
level 5 corresponds to first stage of tertiary education, and level 6 corresponds to second stage of tertiary education.
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3.1.5 Other variables
We mainly consider two other variables: openness, and product market power.
As recalled in the introduction several papers focus on world globalization — proxied by openness,
capital account liberalization, trade liberalization (see Ortega and Rodriguez, 2002, and Harrison, 2002).
Such papers provide evidence of a negative relationship between globalization and labour shares, probably
driven by the fall in workers’ bargaining power. In order to ensure the robustness of our empirical results,
we include such a measure of globalization. We choose two proxies: the most standard, the degree of
openness, derived from Penn World Tables (6.1) and defined as exports plus imports divided by GDP,
and the Capital Account Openness Index (CAOI) computed by Brune et al (2001). For each country,
the CAOI only records two observations over time. Hence, we only use it in our sensitivity analysis.
The focus of our analysis is on labour market distortions. But previous theoretical studies have shown
that product market imperfections tend to reduce the labour share (see Blanchard, 1997). However, as
previously indicated by Nickell (1997) and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), it seems impossible to obtain
measures of product market competition that are suﬃciently consistent to be added to our regressions.
One way to deal with this problem is to use some proxy variables. We use the degree of product market
regulation constructed by Nicoletti et al (1999).
Descriptive statistics for the core variables used in our regressions are shown in Table 1.
3.2 Estimation methodology
Formally, let i denote the country and t the period. We aim to estimate the following equation
LSit = a0i + a
1
t + a
2πit + a3kit + a4LMIit + a5uit + a6Xit + εit (40)
where a0i is a country-specific dummy, a
1
t is a period dummy, LMI is a vector of (two) labour market
institutions and X is a vector other relevant variables. The validation of our model requires a2 > 0,
a4 > 0, a5 < 0, while a3 can either be positive, negative, or not significant. It is also important to
account for the potential endogeneity of the unemployment rate uit. In addition, we must estimate the
following auxiliary regressions:
uit = b
0
i + b
1
t + b
2πit + b
3LMIit + ε
0
it (41)
kit = d0i + d
1
t + d
2πit + d3LMIit + ε00it (42)
The global eﬀect of higher education must be positive, so that a2 + a3d2 + a5b2 > 0.
We proceed in two steps. First we estimate equation (40), then we estimate equations (41) and (42)
through auxiliary regressions.
3.2.1 Estimation of the labour share
The model (40) is estimated by means of fixed-eﬀects regressions18. The results are shown in Table 2.
18We have also performed random-eﬀect estimations. Most of the coeﬃcients have opposite signs, a typical case of the
Simpson’s paradox. The choice of the fixed-eﬀect model is then confirmed by the Hausman test, which rejects the null
hypothesis of independence of country-specific fixed eﬀects.
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TABLE 2
Column a depicts our benchmark regression. In column b, we have added the fiscal wedge among
the regressors, but at the price of losing more than one hundred observations. Columns c accounts for
the possible endogeneity of regressors. Following our theoretical model, the unemployment rate and the
capital-output ratio are treated as potentially endogenous, while we assume that variables resulting from
political or social choices — the minimum wage and the degree of unionization, education — and the degree
of openness are exogenous. We instrument both the capital-output ratio and the unemployment rate by
their first and second lags19. Column c presents a 2SLS regression, while column d presents a GMM
estimation. They have almost identical results.
The results can be commented along five dimensions.
First, the proportion of higher educated (HIGH) has a positive and significant coeﬃcient in all the
regressions we performed, whether we account for the possible endogeneity of regressors or not. It indicates
that an increase of one standard deviation in the proportion of the population with post-secondary
education increases the labour share by about three points, neglecting changes in unemployment rate
and capital to output ratio. This positive impact of higher education is of course the cornerstone of our
empirical analysis. Yet it is not suﬃcient to validate the assertion that higher education erodes employers’
monopsony power. We must also validate the other predictions of our model.
Second, concerning the labour market institutions, the degree of unionization (UNION) and the
minimum wage (MINMED) have a positive and significant coeﬃcient. The unemployment rate (UNR) has
a negative coeﬃcient, yet it is not significant in our benchmark regression. It is not surprising considering
the fact (discussed in the previous section) that the unemployment rate is potentially endogenous to the
labour share. Accordingly, in the IV estimations, the coeﬃcient associated to the unemployment rate
becomes significant. The negative impact of unemployment rate together with the positive impacts of
labour market institutions are key features of our monopsony model.
Third, the parameter associated to the capital-output ratio has a significant and negative sign. This
result departs from Checchi and Garcia-Peñalosa (2005) but it is in accordance with former estimates
by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) who find, with the help of data per sector, a negative sign for almost
all countries but one. It suggests that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is larger
than one20.
TABLE 3
An alternative interpretation is based on our extension on technological complexity. If changes in
capital intensity reflect changes in technological complexity, the regression may well overestimate the
actual impact of capital intensity. To account for this possibility, we have made additional regressions,
19 It reveals extremely diﬃcult to find exogenous variables correlated with the unemployment rate. At the theoretical
level, it is possible to show that corporate taxation does not aﬀect the labour share, yet it reduces tightness. We used the
corporate tax rate as an instrument, but the null hypothesis of exogeneity was rejected by the standard tests.
20 Suppose that output is given by Y = (Kν +Lν)
1
ν . Factors are complements (respectively substitutes) if ν < 0 (ν > 0).
The elasticity of output with respect to labour is 1− α (k) = (1 + (K/L)ν)−1. Its derivative with respect to K/L has the
sign of −ν.
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presented in Table 3. Column a reports our basic fixed-eﬀects regression. In column b, we have omitted
the capital-output ratio. This corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas case. Most coeﬃcients are not aﬀected,
except for the unemployment rate and the degree of openness which become significant. In column c,
we have omitted the time dummies, it does not alter qualitatively our results. However, the coeﬃcient
associated to the capital-output ratio is multiplied by 2 (in absolute value). The fact that the coeﬃcient
of the capital-output ratio is magnified by the absence of dummies, suggests that the time dummies may
capture technological change. This leads us to inspect the coeﬃcients associated to the time dummies in
column a. Figure 2 thus reveals a strongly negative time trend.
FIGURE 2
In column d, we have included a proxy for technological complexity. We have chosen the ratio of R&D
spending to GDP, which is not available before 1980 — we lose three countries and more than half of the
observations (116). As such a ratio is unlikely to alter firms’ contemporaneous technological choices, we
have built a stock variable defined by the five-year average of the ratio. The coeﬃcient attached to this
variable is significant and negative. It means that a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of R&D
spending to GDP induces a 3 point decrease in the labour share. The capital-output ratio is no longer
significant. However, the coeﬃcients associated to the time dummies still define a negative trend.
Finally, in Table 2, the coeﬃcient associated to OPEN has a negative sign. It is not significant in
basic regressions, while it becomes significant in IV regressions. This result is in accordance with Harrison
(2002), and Ortega and Rodriguez (2002), who find a negative and significant impact of globalization
variables on labour shares.
3.2.2 Auxiliary regressions and quantitative implications
To compute the global eﬀect of higher education on the labour share, we need to account for its impacts
on unemployment rate and capital to output ratio. We thus estimate equations (41) and (42) by means
of fixed eﬀects regressions reported in Table 4.
TABLE 4
Those regressions highlight the negative impacts of higher education on the unemployment rate and
capital to output ratio. The former eﬀect is due to the larger job-finding rate benefiting to the higher
educated. The latter eﬀect is explained in the model with capital choice irreversibility by the lower
marginal return to capital investment at given output. As the unemployment rate and the capital to
output ratio negatively impact the labour share, these results strengthen our claim: an increase in the
proportion of higher educated does raise the labour share.
Noteworthy, the LMI have a positive impact on the unemployment rate. Yet the parameter associated
to the minimum wage becomes not significant once the fiscal wedge has been introduced among the
regressors. Similarly, the LMI negatively aﬀect the capital to output ratio. It can be explained in our
model with commitment in capital choice. There, capital investment responds to vacancy profitability, and
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the LMI reduce such a profitability. The fiscal wedge raises both the labour share and the unemployment
rate, in accordance with our discussion in sub-sub-section 2.2.1.
Finally, the real interest rate has a negative but not significant impact on the capital to output ratio.
Given the actual magnitude of changes in the proportion of higher educated, one can easily compute
from such estimates the contribution of higher education to the evolution of the labour share in each
country of our sample. In Table 5, the second column depicts the actual change in labour share from
1970 to 2000 in each country of our sample. The third column reports the actual change in the proportion
of higher educated. The last columns report the predicted impact of such a change on the labour share
for each specification, accounting for alterations in unemployment rate and capital to output ratio.
TABLE 5
The actual decline in the labour share would have certainly been much larger if educational attainment
had not been expanding. According to our benchmark regression — fourth column — the massive increase
in higher education raised the labour share by 2.6 to 10.3 points. The figures are a bit larger when
the fiscal wedge is included — fifth column — and a bit lower in the IV estimations — final column.
This heterogeneity reflects diﬀerences in country-specific changes in the proportion of higher educated.
Interestingly, this helps to explain the diverging trends in labour shares observed in Continental Europe,
on the one hand, and in Anglo-Saxon countries, on the other. Consider France and the United States
for instance: the United States experienced a three-point reduction in the labour share and France a six
point. This divergence is actually lower than the actual diﬀerence in the contribution of education in
these two countries (6.5 to 10 points in the US, and only 3.5 to 5.5 points in France).
3.3 Robustness
In this sub-section, we test whether the robustness of the relationship between higher education and
the labour share persists when we use diﬀerent variables (for the labour share, higher education and
openness). Results are reported in Table 6.
Let us begin with the time dimension. Our estimations are based on annual data. Such data may be
subject to cyclical fluctuations that can aﬀect the results. Even though we have included year dummies
to protect our data from biases induced by exogenous shocks, it seems cautious to test the robustness
of our results for diﬀerent time periods. We run equation (40) with all variables on five year averages
in spite of annual data. Obviously, the sample becomes extremely small (36 observations). The results
reported in column a show that the coeﬃcient of higher education does not change much and stays highly
significant.
TABLE 6
We also reestimate the model with diﬀerent definitions and sources for the labour share, education
and other measures of the capital-output ratio and the degree of openness. First, we focus on the measure
of the dependent variable, the labour share. Columns b to d report estimates of the coeﬃcient on higher
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education with the labour share adjusted or not, measured at the factor cost or at the market price. All
estimations show that the coeﬃcient on higher education is positive and significant (except for the naive
measure at market prices). Second, we focus on education. We replace the proportion of higher educated
from the Barro and Lee dataset by the same variable from the de la Fuente and Domenech dataset.
Results reported in column e are almost unchanged. Third, we test whether results change when we use
a second source for the capital-output ratio. We use the STAN database, which provides the ratio for
the whole economy rather than for the business sector only (column f). Even if the sample becomes very
small (87 observations), the replacement of the measure for the capital-output ratio does not modify the
role of education. We do the same for the degree of openness. We use the capital account openness index
computed by Brune et al (2001). The coeﬃcient associated to this variable is negative and significant
(column g). This strengthens the idea globalization erodes the labour share through increased capital
mobility. In column h, a last variable is added to our regression: the index of stringency of anticompetitive
product market competition (PMR), from Nicoletti et al (1999). Only one regression is reported here,
but we have introduced this index in a number of specifications. The result is always the same: PMR is
not significant. It could be due to the poor quality of the index — a lot of observations are repeated year
after year — and the small sample size — introducing it reduces the sample from 264 to 150 observations.
TABLE 7
As a final sensitivity test, we would like to ensure that the positive impact of higher education is
not an artefact of aggregation between countries. We thus run eleven regressions, one for each country.
Results are reported in Table 7. We observe that all countries but one have a positive coeﬃcient, and
that 7 over 11 countries report significant coeﬃcients.
4 Alternative theories
This section addresses the important question of potential alternative theories. We proceed in three steps.
First, we consider a general production technology with three factors paid their marginal products. We
examine the (restrictive) conditions under which the resulting labour share can increase with the share
of higher educated. Second, we show the three-factor model is unable to predict a positive impact of
labour market institutions and higher education together with a negative impact of the unemployment
rate. Third, we turn to another potential model, based on imperfect competition on the good market,
and wage bargaining on the labour market. In such a model, education can increase the labour share
through majoring workers’ outside options. Actually, this model is very close to our model where firms
are endowed with local monopsony power.
4.1 The three-factor model: theoretical aspects
Suppose that output is produced by means of three inputs: capital K, educated workers H, and unedu-
cated workers L. Hence, Y = F (K,H,L), where F is a neoclassical technology. Factors are paid their
marginal products:
r = FK (K,H,L) , wH = FH (K,H,L) , wL = FL (K,H,L) (43)
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where wH (wL) is the wage of (un)educated workers. The labour share is
LS = 1− rK
F (K,H,L)
(44)
Let eπ = H/ (H + L) be the proportion of educated among employed workers, k = K/ (H + L) be capital
per worker, and f (k, eπ) = F (k, eπ, 1− eπ) output in intensive form. It follows that
LS = 1− kfk (k, eπ)
f (k, eπ) (45)
We address two questions. First, can we derive from equation (45) a labour share regression in which
the impact of the proportion of educated is positive? Second, given some additional restrictions, can we
expect an increase in the proportion π of educated among the workforce/population has a positive eﬀect
on the labour share?
In the neighborhood of some (k0, eπ0), we get
LS ≈ δ0 + δ1k + δ2eπ (46)
What is the expected sign of parameter δ2 = ∂LS(k0, eπ0) /∂eπ? Answering such a question in the general
case reveals too diﬃcult. We thus focus on nested production functions, and more particularly on nested
CES technologies. The main idea consists in grouping two factors within a single class, then considering
output as a function of the resulting class and the third input. Formally, let (x1, x2, x3) be the input
vector, and let G denote the class formed by inputs x1 and x2. We get
F (x1, x2, x3) = F (G (x1, x2) , x3) (47)
We more especially consider
G (x1, x2) = (x
ρ
1 + x
ρ
2)
1/ρ (48)
F (G,x3) = (Gν + xν3)
1/ν (49)
The parameter 1/ (1− ρ) is the intra-class elasticity of substitution between x1 and x2, while the para-
meter 1/ (1− ν) is the inter-class elasticity of substitution between G and x3. Importantly, 1/ (1− ν) is
not the elasticity of substitution between x1 and x3 or x2 and x3. However, Duﬀy, Papageorgiou and
Perez-Sebastian (2004) show an important relationship between such elasticities. Let εij be the elasticity
of substitution between inputs i and j in the three-factor production function. Then21,
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j, εij < εi3 ⇔ ν < ρ (50)
Given some empirically relevant knowledge on εKH and εKL, property (50) provides us with the possibility
to tell whether the diﬀerent conditions on ρ and ν compatible with a positive impact of higher education
are empirically plausible or not. Table 8 depicts the three possible cases (see appendix 6.3).
Table 8: Higher education and the labour share in the three-factor model
21There are diﬀerent ways to measure the elasticities of substitution in a three-factor production function. The two most
famous are the direct elasticity and the Allen elasticity. The set of inequalities (50) holds in both cases.
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Specifications (1) (2) (3)
Output Y [(Hρ + Lρ)
ν
ρ +Kv]
1
ν [(Kρ +Hρ)
ν
ρ + Lν ]
1
ν [(Kρ + Lρ)
ν
ρ +Hν ]
1
ν
Restrictions εKL = εKH εLK = εLH εHK = εHL
Q1 - Labour share equation ∂LS∂eπ < 0 ∂LS∂eπ < 0 ∂LS∂eπ < 0
iﬀ ν (wH − wL) < 0 if ρ < 0 < ν if ν < 0 < ρ
Q2 - Global eﬀect dLSdπ = 0
dLS
dπ R 0
dLS
dπ R 0
Each column corresponds to a particular specification and each specification proceeds to a restriction
on the elasticities of substitution between the diﬀerent inputs. For instance, in specification (1), the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour does not diﬀer across education groups. Lines Q1
examine the likelihood of a positive relationship between higher education and the labour share in the
labour share regression. Line Q2 proceeds to a similar exercise, yet it concerns the global eﬀect of the
proportion of higher educated in the workforce/population on the labour share. To do so, we need
additional information on price determination. As in our model, we assume that the interest rate is
given. The information displayed by lines Q1 and Q2 suggests that the three-factor model may predict a
positive relationship between the labour share and higher education, yet such prediction requires strong
restrictions on the elasticities of substitution between the diﬀerent inputs.
On the one hand, lines Q1 show that popular cases previously investigated in the literature imply
∂LS/∂eπ < 0. In specifications (2) and (3), the proportion of educated reduces the labour share when
capital and educated labour are complements, and both are substitutes to uneducated labour. This
restriction is a typical case of the so-called capital-skill complementarity phenomenon initially studied by
Griliches (1969), and emphasized by Hamermesh (1993).
On the other hand, specification (1) may predict a positive impact of the proportion of educated on
the labour share in the labour share regression. Indeed, one must see wH and wL as wage rates per
eﬃcient unit of labour (H and L incorporating education-specific productivity parameters), hence the
sign of ν (wH − wL) is ambiguous. However, line Q2 shows that the global impact on the labour share of
the relative supply of educated workers cannot be positive in specification (1). In this specification, the
labour share only depends on the interest rate, so that dLS/dπ = 0.
4.2 The three-factor model: empirical aspects
The previous sub-section argues that it is possible to find production functions compatible with a positive
impact of higher education in the following regression:
LS = δ0 + δ1k + δ2eπ + ε (51)
where ε is the vector of residuals. However, we do not perform such regression. Rather, we estimate
LS = δ00 + δ
0
1k + δ
0
2π + δ
0
3u+ δ
0
4LMI + ε
0 (52)
There are two main diﬀerences. On the one hand, we consider π, the proportion of educated workers in
the population/workforce, rather than eπ, the proportion of educated workers among employed workers.
On the other hand, we add the unemployment rate u and two labour market institutions (minimum wage
to median wage ratio, and degree of unionization) to the set of regressors. Importantly, the three-factor
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model predicts the signs of δ02 and δ
0
3 must be the same, while, to a lesser extent, the parameters δ
0
4
should not be significant.
To show this, note that the proportions of educated among the employed and among the work-
force/population are related by:
eπ = π (1− uH)
π (1− uH) + (1− π) (1− uL)
=
∙
1 +
1− π
π
1− uL
1− uH
¸−1
≈
∙
1 +
1− π
π
(1−∆u)
¸−1
where uH and uL are the unemployment rates of educated and uneducated workers, and ∆u ≡ uL − uH
is the unemployment rate diﬀerential. Therefore, ∂eπ/∂π > 0 and ∂eπ/∂ (∆u) > 0. Back to the labour
share, we have in the neighborhood of some (k0, π0,∆u0),
LS ≈ δ000 + δ001k + δ002π + δ003∆u (53)
where δ002 = (∂LS/∂eπ) (∂eπ/∂π) and δ003 = (∂LS/∂eπ) (∂eπ/∂∆u) have the same sign. From the latter
equation, labour market institutions and unemployment rate cannot directly aﬀect the labour share.
Moreover, our regressions include the capital intensity k and the proportion of educated in the population
π among the regressors. It follows that labour market institutions and unemployment rate can only aﬀect
the labour share through changes in the unemployment rate diﬀerential ∆u.
Let us start with the unemployment rate. A tentative guess suggests that it should be positively
correlated with the unemployment rate diﬀerential. The OECD provides homogenous data concern-
ing unemployment rates by education level since 1997. We have performed several regressions of the
unemployment rate diﬀerential on the unemployment rate. The results are shown in Table 9.
TABLE 9
The relationship between the unemployment rate diﬀerential and unemployment rate is unambigu-
ously positive: a one point increase in unemployment rate translates into a half point increase in the
unemployment rate diﬀerential. Put otherwise, an increase in the unemployment rate diﬀerential is cap-
tured in our regression by an increase in unemployment rate. A major prediction follows: In regression
(52), the parameter δ03 must have the sign of parameter δ
0
2 according to the three-factor model, while
δ03 must be negative and δ
0
2 must be positive according to our monopsony model. Our empirical analysis
shows that δ02 > 0 and δ
0
3 < 0. These results are in accordance with our model, yet they cannot be
explained by the three-factor model.
Now, consider the labour market institutions. Both the minimum wage to median wage ratio should
disproportionately alter the uneducated unemployment rate, thereby increasing the unemployment rate
diﬀerential. Thus, they should impact the labour share in the same direction than the proportion of
educated. This is in accordance with our estimates, which report a positive impact of the minimum to
median wage ratio, a positive impact of union density, together with a positive impact of the proportion of
educated. The point is that the unemployment rate is likely to concentrate most of the unemployment rate
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diﬀerential between education groups. In such case, labour market institutions should not be significant
in the regressions. By contrast, our model distinguishes the positive direct eﬀect of such institutions from
their negative indirect eﬀect that is incorporated into the impact of the unemployment rate.
4.3 Accounting for imperfect competition on the good market
One may consider another story relating the labour share to labour market institutions and higher
education. This story builds on Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). They introduce monopolistic competition
on the good market. This originates rents that must be divided between firms and workers. The share of
rents accruing to labour depends on bargaining structures — labour market institutions — and status quo
positions. The latter are aﬀected by the generosity of unemployment compensation and, more generally,
the magnitude of outside options. In turn, such options should decline with the unemployment rate. Such
a general canvas oﬀers a framework in which the unemployment rate and the labour market institutions
aﬀect the labour share.
Now, suppose that education oﬀers adaptability skills that improve workers’ employment perspectives.
This means education raises workers’ outside options at given output. Consequently, education should
increase the share of rents obtained by the workers, and, therefore, the labour share.
This mechanism is very close to the one we examine in this paper. Both have in common labour is
not paid its marginal product. As far as the data are concerned, we did not find any significant impact
of our proxy for imperfections on the good market.
5 Conclusion
This paper suggests that higher education should increase the labour share, because it appreciates workers’
mobility skills, and therefore reduce employers’ monopsony power over wage setting. We proceed in
two steps. First, the main thesis is developed in a two-sector model with heterogenous workers where
monopsony power originates from search frictions on the labour market. Higher education aﬀects the
number of technologies a worker can operate, and thus the number of sectors she can prospect as a job
seeker, and the potential number of job oﬀers she may receive. Hence, higher education raises wage
competition among employers, which implies the labour share is increasing in the proportion of higher
educated. Second, we confront the theory to OECD data covering the period 1970-2000. We identify
higher education to tertiary education as defined in the Barro and Lee (2000) dataset. Typically, an
increase of one standard deviation in higher education induces a three point increase in the labour share.
This result appears robust to various issues like endogeneity bias and alternative data sources. The
other determinants of the labour share include the capital to output ratio (-), the minimum to median
wage ratio (+), the unemployment rate (-), and union density (+). Those results are compatible with
our model, while they are inconsistent with a three-factor model where factors are paid their marginal
products.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Construction of the labour shares
From OECD definitions (Economic Outlook Statistics and Projections, 2002), we can compute:
LS mp =
WSSS
GDP
LS fc =
WSSS
GDP - TIND + TSUB
LS mp adj =
WSSS (1+ (ES / (ET - ES)))
GDP
LS fc adj =
WSSS (1+ (ES / (ET - ES)))
GDP - TIND + TSUB
where:
WSSS = Compensation of employees, at current prices, national currency
GDP= Value added at market prices, current prices, national currency.
TIND = Net indirect taxes
TSUB = Subsidies
ES = Number of self-employed
ET= Total employment
6.2 Other data sources and definitions
• CAOI: Capital Account Openness Index (CAOI); unit: Varying between 0 (fully closed) and 9 (fully
open).
The index is based on nine categories of capital account transactions: (1) payments from invisible
transactions; (2) proceeds from invisible transactions; (3) inward controls on money market transac-
tions; (4) outward controls on money market transactions; (5) inward controls on credit operations;
(6) outward controls on credit operations; (7) inward controls on foreign direct investment and
real estate; (8) outward controls on foreign direct investment and real estate; (9) and controls on
provisions and operations of commercial and credit institutions. Each category is coded as either
having significant restrictions (“closed”) or not (“open”). The index is the sum of the scores for
the dummy variables in each of these categories. Data are available for two sub-periods: 1973-1979
and 1990-1999.
Source: Brune, N., Garrett, G., Guisinger, A., and Sorens, J., 2001.The political economy of capital
account liberalization. Working Paper, Yale University and UCLA
• HIGHDOM: Percentage of higher school attained in population over age 25
Source: Educational Attainment levels in the OECD, 1960-1995, De la Fuente and Domenech, 2001,
version 2.1
• HIGH: Percentage of higher school attained in total population; five years average, interpolated to
obtain annual data
Source: Barro, R. J. and Lee J.W., 2000. International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates
and Implications (CID Working Paper no. 42)
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• INTEREST: Real interest rate = T-Bill-CPIant, where T-Bill is a short-term debt obligation issued
by the US Treasury at a discount under competitive bidding, with a maturity of up to one year, and
CPIant is the expected Consumer Price Index one-year ahead forecast formed from a univariate
ARMA(1,1) process
Source: International Fund Statistics, 2005
• KYT: Ratio of real capital stock on value-added at market price;
Source : value-added at market price (GDPD) comes from ISDB (OECD) at 1990 prices and 1990
PPA (US$)
• KY: Ratio of capital stock in business (KBV) on GDP in private sector (GDPBV)
Source : OECD Economic Outlook, vol. 2002/2.
• MINMED: Ratio of the minimum on the median wage
Source : OECD Labour Force Statistics database
data available at http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsdataauthenticate.asp.
• OPEN: Index = (Imports+Exports) / real GDP (Laspeyres); unit : % of 1996 price
Source : Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B., Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for Inter-
national Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002
• PMR: Global index of stringency of anticompetitive product market regulation; unit: varying be-
tween 0 and 6 from least to most stringent
Source : OECD Employment Outlook, 2002.
• R&D: Total national spendings in research and development, in five years average lags; unit: % of
GDP
Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int, (June 2005)
• TAX WEDGE: Total tax wedge including employer’s social security contributions; unit: average
rate in %
Source: OECD, 2005.
• UNION: Union membership index; Specific studies and if does not available, administrative data
Source : OECD Labour Force Statistics database.
• UNR: Unemployment rate; unit: %
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics database.
6.3 Higher education and the labour share in the three-factor model
In this Appendix, we compute the labour share in the diﬀerent cases shown by Table 8.
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6.3.1 Specification (1): Y = F (G(L,H),K)
Output is:
Y = [(Lρ +Hρ)
ν
ρ +Kν ]
1
ν = (L+H)f(k, eπ) (54)
with
f(k, eπ) = [((1− eπ)ρ + eπρ) νρ + kν ] 1ν (55)
Each input is paid its marginal product:
wH = f(k, eπ)1−ν ((1− eπ)ρ + eπρ) νρ−1 eπρ−1 (56)
wL = f(k, eπ)1−ν ((1− eπ)ρ + eπρ) νρ−1 (1− eπ)ρ−1 (57)
r = f(k, eπ)1−νkν−1 (58)
The labour share is:
LS = 1− k
ν
((1− eπ)ρ + eπρ) νρ + kν (59)
It follows that:
∂LS
∂eπ sign= ν [wH − wL] (60)
When r is given, we obtain:
LS = 1− r− ν1−ν (61)
6.3.2 Specification (2): Y = F (G(K,H), L)
Output is:
Y =
h
(Kρ +Hρ)
ν
ρ + Lν
i 1
ν
= (H + L)f (k, eπ) (62)
where
f (k, eπ) = h(kρ + eπρ) νρ + (1− eπ)νi 1ν
Factors are paid their marginal product:
wH = f (k, eπ)1−ν (kρ + eπρ) νρ−1eπρ−1 (63)
wL = f (k, eπ)1−ν (1− eπ)ν−1 (64)
r = f (k, eπ)1−ν (kρ + eπρ) νρ−1kρ−1 (65)
The labour share is:
LS = 1− k
ρ
kρ + eπρ + (1− eπ)ν(kρ + eπρ)1− νρ (66)
The derivative of LS with respect to eπ is:
dLS
deπ sign= ρeπρ−1 h1 + (1− eπ)νz −νρ i− ν(1− eπ)ν−1z−νρ hz + (1− eπ)eπρ−1i (67)
where z = kρ + eπρ. The two terms in brackets are strictly positive. Therefore ∂LS/∂eπ < 0 if ρ > 0 > ν.
6.3.3 Specification (3): Y = F (G(K,L),H)
Output is
Y = [(Kρ + Lρ)
ν
ρ +Hν ]
1
ν (68)
The analysis is similar to specification (2). We get ∂LS/∂eπ < 0 if ν > 0 > ρ.
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Figure 1: Share of population with post-secondary education
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Sources: Barro and Lee dataset, interpolated over 5-years 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Time dummies 
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Notes: Are reported the time dummies for the regression of Table 2, column (a). 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statitics of the main variables 
     
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labour shares in business      
LS mp 264 53.102 3.900 40.111 60.211
LS mp adjusted 264 63.222 4.784 49.287 79.388
LS fc 250 59.245 3.726 45.840 65.654
LS fc adjusted 250 70.232 4.438 56.327 83.334
Education      
High level attainment from B&L (HIGH) 264 21.585 12.629 2.692 53 
High level attainment from D.F.& D (HIGH DF&D) 201 21.909 10.274 5.704 48.02
Labour market      
Unemployment rate (UNR) 264 6.823 3.660 .076 18.436
Unionization (UNION) 264 30.524 14.522 7.4 69.1 
Minimum to median wage ratio (MINMED) 264 47.424 10.350 28 65 
Tax wedge  185 35.391 6.790 24.3 46.114
Other variables      
Research and Development in %GDP (R&D) 116 1.917 .678 .41 2.844
Capital/Output ratio in business (KY)* 264 32.503 8.482 21.801 54.228
Openness degree (OPEN)* 264 17.983 12.880 3.261 69.693
Capital Account Openness Index (CAOI)* 264 4.159 3.027 0 8 
Real interest rate (INTEREST) 193 3.130 2.880 3.936 9.437
Note: for sources and/or calculations see Appendix.     
 
 
Table 2: Regression results, basic specifications 
          
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Estimation method Fixed Effects Fixed Effects IV/2SLS GMM 
HIGH 0.226*** 0.262*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 
  [0.047] [0.069] [0.030] [0.030] 
KY -0.230*** -0.187** -0.275*** -0.259*** 
  [0.074] [0.082] [0.083] [0.081] 
MINMED 0.085*** 0.026 0.106*** 0.110*** 
  [0.030] [0.044] [0.035] [0.035] 
OPEN -0.005 -0.01 -0.124** -0.126*** 
  [0.070] [0.066] [0.048] [0.048] 
UNION 0.164*** 0.112*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 
  [0.026] [0.026] [0.021] [0.021] 
UNR -0.045 -0.167* -0.253* -0.281** 
  [0.095] [0.099] [0.132] [0.127] 
TAX WEDGE  0.250***   
   [0.081]   
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 264 185 252 252 
Countries 11 11 10 10 
R-squared 0.77 0.81   
Hansen-Sargan     0.207 0.268 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Hansen-Sargan is a test of overidentifying restrictions, P-value is reported  
 
Table 3: Role of the capital-output ratio 
          
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Estimation method Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
HIGH 0.226*** 0.239*** 0.123*** 0.262*** 
  [0.047] [0.048] [0.030] [0.063] 
KY -0.230***  -0.495*** 0.043 
  [0.074]  [0.059] [0.105] 
MINMED 0.085*** 0.063** 0.116*** 0.318*** 
  [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.108] 
OPEN -0.005 0.112* -0.281*** -0.401*** 
  [0.070] [0.061] [0.040] [0.086] 
UNION 0.164*** 0.123*** 0.264*** 0.426*** 
  [0.026] [0.023] [0.022] [0.050] 
UNR -0.045 -0.207** 0.136* -0.264*** 
  [0.095] [0.082] [0.069] [0.094] 
R&D    -4.782** 
     [2.288] 
Period dummies Yes Yes No Yes 
      
Observations 264 264 264 116 
Countries 11 11 11 8 
R-squared 0.77 0.76 0.65 0.91 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
 
Table 4: Auxiliary regressions 
          
  UNR UNR KY KY 
HIGH -0.130*** -0.133** -0.389*** -0.343*** 
  [0.037] [0.057] [0.044] [0.066] 
MINMED 0.079*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.119** 
  [0.024] [0.033] [0.028] [0.045] 
INTEREST   -0.005 -0.068 
    [0.049] [0.071] 
UNION 0.007 0.01 0.095*** 0.077*** 
  [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.021] 
TAX WEDGE  0.137**  0.215** 
   [0.057]  [0.093] 
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 352 266 193 151 
Countries 18 18 9 9 
R-squared 0.57 0.31 0.71 0.52 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 5: Contribution of education to labour share movements (in points) 
      
  Observed Observed Contribution Contribution Contribution
Country ∆LS  ∆HIGH FE FE + tax wedge IV 
Australia (1980-2000) -2.9 8.6 2.7 3.0 2.0 
Belgium (1975-2000) -5.9 13.6 4.3 4.7 3.1 
Canada 0.0 32.6 10.3 11.4 7.4 
Spain (1980-2000) -8.3 9.1 2.9 3.2 2.1 
France -6.1 15.4 4.9 5.4 3.5 
UK -0.8 11.2 3.5 3.9 2.6 
Irland (1971-2000) -22.7 14.7 4.6 5.1 3.3 
Italy -7.0 12.1 3.8 4.2 2.8 
Japan (1975-2000) -13.9 16.7 5.3 5.8 3.8 
Netherlands -9.0 14.8 4.7 5.2 3.4 
New Zealand (1972-2000) -8.6 31 9.8 10.8 7.1 
USA -3.2 28.8 9.1 10.0 6.6 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis 
                        
  Time sensitivity Measure sensitivity 
  sub-periods 5 years Labour shares  HIGH      
  1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 av. LS mp LS fc LS fc adj.  DF&D KY Openness Oil price
HIGH 0.043 0.365*** 0.091* 0.197** 0.057 0.171*** 0.362***   0.331*** 0.119** 0.249***
  [0.053] [0.110] [0.068] [0.087] [0.038] [0.045] [0.064]   [0.097] [0.048] [0.053] 
                    
                    
HIGH DF& D            0.212***      
             [0.081]      
KY in the whole economy              0.431    
               [1.755]    
CAOI                -0.566***  
                 [0.108]  
Real oil price                  0.285* 
                      [0.148] 
Observations 78 84 102 59 143 130 130 201 164 264 244 
Countries 7 9 11 11 9 8 8 9 7 11 11 
R-squared 0.37 0.73 0.65 0.77 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.70 0.67 0.80 0.78 
 
 
Table 7: Estimations country by country  
     
Countries HIGH Standard errors Observations R-squared 
Australia 0.149 [0.601] 26 0.68 
Belgium -0.655 [0.403] 31 0.92 
Canada 0.167** [0.070] 35 0.47 
France 2.645*** [0.358] 36 0.93 
Italy 0.001* [0.429] 40 0.90 
Japan 1.336*** [0.206] 36 0.88 
Netherlands 0.477* [0.495] 32 0.91 
New Zealand 0.251 [0.247] 29 0.80 
Spain 1.675 [1.326] 20 0.87 
UK 2.692*** [0.860] 31 0.57 
USA 0.062* [0.034] 41 0.91 
Notes:* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
R-squared is the within-R-squared.   
MINMED has been removed from regressions in order to obtain more 
observations      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Unemployment rate and 
 unemployment rate differential 
 
  (a) (b) (c) 
  pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
UL-UH 0.398*** 0.461*** 0.502*** 
  [0.041] [0.052] [0.052] 
     
Period dummies No No  Yes 
Observations 220 220 220 
Countries 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.39 
Notes : Standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
